Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

2001

Robert W. Hughes v. : Unknown
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
wendell E. Bennett; Strong and Hanni; Attorney for Utah State Bar Commission.
Rex J. Hanson; Hanson, Wadsworth and Russon; Attorneys for Robert W. Hughes.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Hughes v., No. 13900.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/1073

This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

}

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF U T A H
In re ROBERT W. HUGHES
Disciplinary Proceedings

Case No.
13900

BRIEF ON APPEAL
APPEAL FROM THE DECISION OF THE
UTAH STATE BAR COMMISSION

Rex J. Hanson
HANSON, WADSWORTH
& RUSSON
702 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Robert W. Hughes

Wendell Bennett
STRONG & HANNI
604 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Utah State
Bar Commission

S

:!

n
;

r

i; ))

J&H3 1W5

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,Chtk.
J. Reuben
Clark Law School, BYU.
Supwmro^rWfcT
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

1

ARGUMENT

5

THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE
FINDING THAT HUGHES' USE OF THE
FUNDS RECEIVED FROM FONG WAS DISPUTED BY HIS CLIENT
CONCLUSION

5
10

Cases Cited
In Re Barclay, 82 Utah 288, 24 P.2d 302 (1933)

9

Brawner v. State of California, 313 P.2d 1 (1957)

8

Code of Professional Responsibility, Rule III,
Canon 9, DR 9-102(A)(B)(l) and (3)

5

In Re McCullough, 97 Utah 533, 95 P.2d 13
Smoot v. Lund, 13 U2d 168, 369 P.2d 933 (1962)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10
8

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
In re ROBERT W. HUGHES
Disciplinary Proceedings

Case No.
13900

BRIEF ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Robert W. Hughes, Appellant, respectfully petitions
the Court to reverse the Decision of the Board of Commissioners of the Utah State Bar suspending him from
the practice of law for a period of one year and thereafter until Robert W. Hughes shall reimburse the Utah
State Bar for the actual expenses incurred by it in connection with the disciplinary proceeding, or in the alternative, that the Court modify the Decision by imposing
in lieu thereof a more appropriate reduced penalty.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Robert W. Hughest is an attorney at law and is a
member of the Utah State Bar residing in Salt Lake City,
Utah. His office address is 80 West Louise Avenue, Salt
Lake City, Utah.
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He owned 50% of the stock of Little Dutch Girl
Bakers, Inc. when it was incorporated in 1971; he was
also a director, secretary and legal counsel for said company until the fall of 1972 (Tr. 7, 8). In the early part
of 1972 the company's capital was increased in order to
provide additional working capital, and Hughes and the
other stockholders agreed to reduce their percentage of
ownership to allow for the additional capital needed
(Tr.8,9).
Initially, the other 50% of the stock was owned by
Frank Bakker. Hughes and Bakker first became acquainted in 1966 or 1967. They were officers in a baking company which they operated under the name of
Bakker's Royal Dutch Cookies. A dispute arose and
Hughes was discharged from the company in 1968 (Tr.
118, 119, 120). Subsequently, the company failed.
The testimony of Bakker and Hughes was in dispute
as to who solicited who to go back into business together
in September of 1971 (Tr. 120, 260). However, letters
from Bakker to Hughes (Ex. D-18, D-19) show that
Bakker was anxious to associate with Hughes in forming
the new company, Bakker's Famous Dutch Cookies, which
subsequently became Little Dutch Boy (Tr. 259, 260).
Bakker was president of the various companies and became familiar with the business aspects.
It became necessary to raise $50,000.00 to operate
the business under the name of Little Dutch Girl, which
contemplated an infusion of additional capital and the
operation of a bakery in California. In order to raise
the money, Hughes agreed to contact friends, some of
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whom had been investors in the earlier company, Bakker's
Famous Dutch Cookies. It was necessary for Hughes to
incur traveling expenses in raising this money. Bakker
testified that he thought Hughes was raising the funds
for stock in the company (Tr. 267). This was disputed
by Hughes (Tr. 35, 55, 128, 133, Ex. D-12). Hughes'
version is supported by the undisputed evidence of the
meeting of the Board of Directors of Bakker's Famous
Dutch Cookies, Inc., on February 4, 1972, which provided in paragraph 8 that the officers of the company
were, "authorized to reimburse or to pay to themselves
for costs incurred or services rendered from funds they
may generate from the sale of company stock or distribution rights." (Ex. D-10). Hughes was authorized to
write checks on the company bank account (Ex. D - l l )
and did so (P.R. Ex. 4).
In August of 1972, Hughes received a check for
$2,000.00 from one Lee Fong, an investor in Little Dutch
Girl, Inc. (Ex. P.R.-l). This sum was deposited by Hughes
in his personal bank account and the proceeds used to
reimburse himself for expenses he had incurred in promoting the company. Hughes testified that he had discussed using these funds with Bakker in a telephone conversation with Bakker (Tr. 34, 35). Bakker said he
didn't recall the conversation (Tr. 268). Hughes testified that he had sold his own stock to Fong, which was
accomplished by a reduction in the number of his shares
(Tr. 41, 42), which the complainants did not dispute.
The letter to the Bar Commission signed by Bakker and
Monson complaining of Hughes' involvement in the Fong
transaction states, "The justification of expenses may be
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correct, but the method in which the money was obtained
we feel to be highly unethical." The evidence was undisputed that Hughes had incurred expenses on the company's behalf in the approximate sum of $4,982.91 (Ex.
D-12). Bakker and Monson were reimbursed for expenses
they had incurred in connection with company business
(Tr.242).
Discord developed between Bakker, Monson and
Hughes culminated about October 27, 1972 (Tr. 235)
when Hughes was discharged as secretary and attorney
for the company (Tr. 284, D-14).
In a subsequent meeting of the directors of the company on November 21, 1972, the objections of the receiver of Hawkeye assets to any transfer of those assets to
Little Dutch Girl Bakers, because of Hughes' claim and
lawsuit were discussed. Monson and Bakker's letter to the
Bar Commission complaining of Hughes was signed and
apparently mailed on November 24, 1972 (Ex. D-15),
three days later. This letter was the first indication to
Hughes that Bakker had a complaint over the Fong transaction.
Count Two of the Complaint was dismissed. Regarding Count Three, the evidence is undisputed that on
July 9, 1971, Hughes issued a check to Ryberg, McCoy
and Halgren in the sum of $1,500.00 in payment of a
client's debt, which was returned as written against "uncollected funds." The evidence is also undisputed that
when the check was written, there were sufficient funds
in Hughes' account to clear the check (Tr. 110, Ex., D-8).
The check was re-issued and cleared on September 15,
1971 (Tr. 112).
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ARGUMENT
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE
FINDING THAT HUGHES' USE OF THE
FUNDS RECEIVED FROM FONG WAS DISPUTED BY HIS CLIENT.
The Decision of the Hearing Officers of the Bar
Commission is that Hughes violated the provisions of
Rule III, Canon 9, DR 9-102(A) and (B) (1) and (3), (Tr.
00021-00025), which reads as follows:
DR 9-102 Preserving Identity of Funds and Property of a Client.
(A) All funds of clients paid to a lawyer or law
firm, other than advances for costs and expenses, shall be deposited in one or more
identifiable bank accounts maintained in the
state in which the law office is situated and
no funds belonging to the lawyer or law
firm shall be deposited therein except as follows:
*

•

*

(B) A lawyer shall:
(1) Promptly notify a client of the receipt of
his funds, securities, or other properties.
*
#
#
(3) Maintain complete records of all funds,
securities, and other properties of a client
coming into the possession of the lawyer
and render appropriate accounts to his
client regarding them.
*
*
*
The Decision states that Hughes violated the foregoing Canon of Ethics and Disciplinary Rules by applying
funds of his client to his own use when his right to do so
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was dispuetd by his client and in failing to maintain said
funds in an identifiable bank account located in the State
of Utah; that is, co-mingling his funds with clients' funds,
in failing to notify his client of the receipt of said funds
and in not maintaining funds and rendering appropriate
accounts to his client regarding said funds.
At the outset there is a question whether Hughes sold
his own stock or company stock. Granted, there was some
juggling of the shares of stock owned by the promoters in
order to have sufficient stock to issue to the investors and
still comply with the Underwriters requirement as the
percentage of stock that could be held by the "insiders."
The evidence is undisputed that the amount of stock
initially owned by Hughes and the other promoters was
reduced. Hughes testified that he sold Fong his stock
(Tr. 41, 42), which was not disputed by the complainants.
Even if the stock could be considered company stock,
which isn't clear, the evidence was undisputed that Hughes
had either actual or implied permission to reimburse himself for expenses incurred in promotion of company business. He was authorized to write checks on the company
account. A resolution of the Meeting of the Board of
Directors on February 4, 1972, authorized he and the
other officers to pay to themselves for costs incurred or
rendered from funds generated from the sale of company
stock or distribution rights. Hughes testified that in a
telephone conversation with Bakker in which Hughes'
need for reimbursement of funds for incurred expenses
was discussed, Bakker suggested he use the funds received
from Fong. Bakker testified he didn't recall the conversation.
;:-.M-V/-0
.a§^>*v<-\\
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There was no attempt to conceal the fact that Fong
was a stockholder. His name was listed as a stockholder
in the Reg A application to the S.E.C. and on a stock
certificate issued to Fong signed by Bakker (Ex. D-20).
True, Bakker testified that he signed a number of certificates in blank and was unaware of the sale of stock to
Fong until his attention was directed to it by Monson (Tr.
256).
The evidence is also undisputed that Bakker and
Monson were reimbursed from company funds for expenses incurred in company business (Tr. 242). Hughes
spent more time and effort in raising funds and incurred
more expense than the other principals.
There is no contention that Hughes' reimbursement
of himself for expenses was fraudulent (Tr. 135). It is
significant that no demand was made by complainants
of Hughes to account for the Fong funds and that Hughes'
first notice of the complaint was Bakker and Monson's
letter to the Bar Commission on November 24, 1972,
which states the justification of the expenses may be correct, but the method by which the money was obtained was
unethical. This letter was written after a Meeting of the
Board of Directors on November 21, 1972, in which
Hughes' claim for a fee and his objection to transfer of
Hawkeye assets was discussed. The inference is that the
letter was motivated by the dispute, and not by a bona
fide claim against Hughes,
In this instance, it is conceded that Hughes comingled client funds with his own and did not render an
appropriate account to the company.
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Regarding Count Three, the evidence was undisputed
that Hughes justifiably believed there were sufficient
funds in his account to cover the check written to Ryberg
on July 9, 1971, which was returned because of uncollected funds. A check for the amount was reissued on September 15, 1972, which cleared. Hughes did not maintain
a separate account for clients' funds which was the only
ethical violation involved in the Ryberg transaction.
Charges of unprofessional conduct on the part of an
attorney should be sustained by convincing proof and to
a reasonable certainty; any reasonable doubt should be
resolved in favor of the accused. Brawner v. State of California, 313 P.2d 1, decided 1957.
The circumstances in this case should also be considered in determining whether Hughes violated ethical
standards in reimbursing himself for expenses incurred
in discharging his duties as an officer of the company.
There is no evidence that Hughes violated a fiduciary
duty to his client. Hughes and the officers were engaged
in promoting the company as businessmen. Hughes had
not only represented Bakker as an attorney for a period
of years, but had participated with him in prior business
ventures. Bakker attempted to give the impression that
he was naive and unsophisticated and relied solely on
Hughes in all transactions involving the company's business, a contention frequently made by laymen in disputes
with lawyers which is not always warranted, and was not
supported by the evidence in this instance.
In Smoot v. Lund, 13 U2d 168, 369 P.2d 933 (1962)
which was an action for fraud and reformation of a contract, the Court said:
8
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in a situation such as that found here, where
the attorney had represented a client, but entered
into negotiations with him in which it was clearly
apparent to the latter that the attorney was dealing
in his own interests, it is neither reasonable nor
practical to suppose that the attorney will represent the client's interest to the entire exclusion of
his own. Nor does the law require it. The plaintiffs appear to be intelligent business people and
they were dealing in a very substantial business
transaction. There is nothing mysterious or inscrutable about this contract. They were able to
read and understand it and they do not claim to
the contrary; nor do they allege any concealment
or deception as to its contents.
We recognize that the Findings and Decision of the
Bar Commission are entitled to great weight, and should
be sustained if reasonably supported by the evidence, and
we do not contend that the Hearing Officers arrived at
their decision arbitrarily or capriciously. The Bar Commission decision constitutes recommended punishment
which may be adopted, modified or rejected by this Court.
Every case must be judged on its own facts.
In the following cases in which the charges against
the attorney were more aggravated than in the case at
Bar, this Court reduced the time of suspension:
In Re Barclay, 82 Utah 288, 24 P.2d 302 (1933). Unethical conduct, wilful disobedience in violation of an
Order of the Court in appropriating a client's money to his
own use. The Bar Commission recommended suspension
for six months; the Supreme Court reduced suspension to
three months.
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In Re McCullough, 97 Utah 533, 95 P.2d 13. Unethical conduct, solicitation of employment in personal
injury cases, disobedience of Order of Court to disclose
whereabouts of an accused person released to his custody,
gave false testimony under oath The Bar Commission
recommended two year's suspension; the Supreme Court
reduced suspension to nine months.

CONCLUSION
In essence the evidence shows that Hughes did not
deposit client funds in a separate identifiable trust account
which, though a violation of the proscription of the Professional Responsibility Code, does not merit one year's
suspension from the practice of law. Without in any way
attempting to presume upon the judgment of this Court,
we submit that the Decision of the Utah Bar Commission
should be reversed or in the alternative, modified to a
more appropriate reduced penalty.
Respectfully submitted,
Rex J. Hanson
HANSON, WADS WORTH
& RUSSON
702 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Robert W. Hughes
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